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'MONTAGUE'S INTENSIONAL LOGIC AND 
THE THEORY OF TYPES 
* Raymond Turner 
Is the type theory built into Montague's Intensional Logic (IL) a 
91. 
help or a hinderance? In the paper ''The Proper Treatment of Quantification 
in Ordinary English" (commonly abbreviated PTQ) Intensional Logic is used 
- as an intermediate specification language. English is translated into IL 
and the semantics of IL is separately provided. Given this task does IL 
perform it adequately? Furthermore, how well does it continue to perform 
this task when PTQ is extended in the way advocated by (for example) Bennett 
[1974]? The particular dimension we are interested in relates to the type 
theory. which forms a central component of IL. Does the type theory in IL 
serve any useful purpose or does it just get in the way of an elegant and 
intuitively correct semantic theory? 
h1hy is IL based on the typed Lambda Calculus and not on Church's 
untyped system? I am sure that a f ull answer t o this question should be 
partly historical but it is not in this aspect of the question that I am 
interested. Perhaps the question ought t o be ·put in the following form: 
is there now any good reason why IL should be based on the typed as opposed 
to the untyped Lambda Calculus? 
I believe that one a rgument we might try to construct, in favor of 
type-theory in IL, relates to the categorial structure of English syntax 
* Supported in part by A. P. Sloan Founda t i on Gr ant 80-6-13. 
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as it is presented in PTQ. Consider the syntactic categories IV (intransitive 
verb phrases) and IAV (intransitive adverbs). Expressions in IV denote 
functions in E-;- T (entities to truth-values) whereas expressions in IAV 
denote functions in (E-+ T)-+ (E..,... T). The whole of the Montague program is 
premised on the assumption that the meanings of expressions are functions of 
certain kinds, Once this assumption is made it is natural to employ higher-order 
functions of various kinds - as in the case of intransitive adverbs. 
The next stage in the argument involves IL itself. Intensional Logic is 
introduced as a language intermediate between English surface structure and 
its semantic specification. If the meanings of various syntactic categories 
in English are ultimately to be various higher-order functions, and IL is to 
serve as an intermediary between English and its semantic specification, then 
IL must itself be a language capable of expressing such higher-order functions. 
But what does this mean? Does it mean, for example, that our inter-
mediate language needs to be typed? I do not think so. One can express a 
great deal more in an untyped Lambda calculus than one can in its typed 
counterpart. Certainly, if all we require is the ability to name higher-
order functions then Church's untyped Lambda calculus is a reasonable candidate. 
The purpose of this paper is not to examine all the arguments in 
favor of IL being typed. It has a much more positive purpose. We believe 
that type-theory may have a certain role to play in the semantics of natural 
language but that it is not best located in IL itself. As a consequence, we 
suggest a natural type-free alternative to IL and provide its syntax and 
semantics, 
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2. A PROBLEM FOR 
MONTAGUE'S INTENSIONAL LOGIC 
I want to consider a problem which has recently been brought to our 
attention by Terry Parsons [1979]. I will illustrate the problem by 
reference to the following sentence: 
(1) Jill is crazy, 
According to the tradition of Montague grammar (ignoring intensionality) the 
meaning of a verb phrase like "is crazy" is a function from E (entities) to 
T (truth-values). Similarly, the meaning of the verb phrase "is writing 
papers" in (2) is a function from E to T: 
(2) John is writing papers. 
But what are we to make of the phrase "To write papers'' in the sentence: 
(3) To write papers is crazy? 
Presumably, the meaning of "To write papers" also has functionality E-+ T. 
But then, in (3), the verb phrase "is crazy" must have functionality 
(E-+ T) -+ T, We might continue in the like fashion, Consider the sentence: 
(4) To be (so) crazy is beyond belief; 
where the intention is to refer to the sense of "crazy" exemplified in (3). 
I take it, that in (4) the verb phrase "is beyond belief" has functionality 
((E-+T) -+T) -+T, In principle, given enough ingenuity and patience, we 
could continue this process indefinitely, But let's not. 
We can best illustrate the problem more abstractly as follows, Consider 






Every individual has a property; 
Every property has a property; 
Every property which some property has has a property; 
Every property which some property which some property 
has has has a property; 
3
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In the first sentence the word ''property will be represented semantically 
as a function in 
P = E-+T, 
0 
The ''property" of sentence (ii) will have futi.ctionality 
p = p -+ T· 
1 0 ' 
and generally properties of type n+l will be functions from properties of 
type n to truth-values: 
= p _,.. T • 
n 
Where does "is crazy" come in this hierarchy? Apparently, everywhere; 
just like the word "property" the verb phrase "is crazy" denotes a function 
at all levels in the hierarchy, Unfortunately, IL itself cannot manage such 
complexity. In IL "is crazy'1 must be associated with a function of fixed 
type, Parsons seems to endorse the view that '1 is crazy" occurs everywhere 
throughout the hierarchy when he represents a verb phrase like "is crazy" as an 
infinite sequence of functions one for each level in the hierarchy. 
Indeed, as Parsons points out,such duplication of entities in one 
syntactic category leads to duplication in others. For example, the adverb 
"allegedly" is a verb phrase modifier and so has functionality Prop -+ Prop 
where Prop is the semantic domain of Properties. But, as we have just 
observed, Prop is a whole hierarchy of domains not just one, Subsequently, 
the meaning of "allegedly" is an infinite sequence of functions <a> n ~w 
v1here a e M and where 
n n 
= M -+M , 
n n 
So, on the face of it, we have a solution to the problem of sentences like 
1 - 4 and i - iv. The word "property" is associated with an infinite sequence 
4
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of functions-one for each member of the hierarchy. But there is still 
something unsatisfactory about this solution. According to it the meaning 
of "is crazy'1 is an arbitrary sequence of functions <f > where f E. P n n~w n n 
for ne:w. But this is not all that our intuitions demand; they demand 
that fn and fn+l have something in commorr. We want to insist that when fn+l 
is restricted to the domain off then this function is exactly f , But 
n n 
as things stand we cannot do this since the domains P and P 1 are disjoint. n n-
We need to make our function spaces cumulative in some way. Eve'ntually, 
we shall achieve this with the aid of identification mappings between the 
domains. 
We now turn our attention to sentences which seem problematic even for 
this theory. In his paper Parsons sets an exercise for the reader: try 
thinking to yourself "everything has some property" without restricting 
"everything 11 to things of a given type. I think this is an interesting 
challenge, I for one find it hard to think about this sentence without the 
structure imposed by type-theory. Type-theory seems able to play a conceptual 
role here and enables us to make sense of this sentence. So,at this stage 
in the analysis, I am very reluctant to give up type-theory. Nevertheless, 
we do seem to be able to assert 
(5) Everything has a property 
and mean every thing - not just things of some particular type. So in 
what sense Jo we do this? I believe that something like the following is 
going on, When we assert (5) we are asserting 
(Sn) Everythingn has a propertyn+l 
for every n. That is, we assert every thing of type has a property of n 
type 
1 
for everv level in the hierarchy. Parsons has no way of saying this n+ ~ ~ ~~-
in his system. In fact, he quotes Russell's solution to this problem which 
is to supplement the grammar with a theory of pragmatics according to which 
5
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when we assert the above sentence (5) we automatically assert all of its 
meanings i.e. for each n, one asserts that everything of type n has a 
property. Whether this is part of the semantics or the pragmatics is a 
moot point but how does one get a formal theory to capture the intuition 
in either case? 
Similar considerations seem to apply to the sentence: 
(6) Being crazy is (just) crazy. 
I think there is a clear sense to this sentence but how are we to interpret 
it in the context of our hierarchy? Presumably, we have made a statement in 
form similar to (5 ); when one asserts (6) one automatically asserts all of 
its meanings i.e. for each n, one asserts: 
(6n) Being crazyn is (just) crazyn+l· 
In the context of type theory, I can see no other way to make sense of the 
English sentence (6). Note that Parsoru's theory would supply no meaning 
at all to (6) since, presumably, the type of "is" (or "has") would rule it 
ungranunatical. 
One thing seems clear. There is no hope of capturing these intuitions 
in a language like IL which is typed. In such a language verb phrases like 
"is crazy" will be assigned a specific type. English is just not a typed 
language in this strong sense. In section 5 we introduce a language (which 
might fulfill this role of an intermediate language), which is not typed, 
6
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INFINITE TYPE 
97. 
These considerations seem to impose two constraints or adequacy conditions 
on any intuitively correct semantic theory: 
(I) We need to be able to represent the meanings of words 
and phrases (like "property", "is crazy", ttallegedly") 
as infinite sequences of functions which satisfy certain 
conditions; 
(II) We require a definition of application (and indeed 
self-applications) for such infinite sequences. 
Fortunately, Dana Scott has provided us with a ready-made mathematical 
theory. We now outline the main ideas behind Scott's theory. The treatment 
will be very brief and only enough detail will be included to whet the readers 
appetite. The full details are available in Scott [1972] and Barandregt [1977]. 
The following two notions are fundamental: 
COMPLETE LATTICES 
A complete lattice is a 
partially ordered set 
<D,!:_> such that each subset 
XC::..D has at least upper 
bound, 
(Notice that this guarantees the existence of greatest lower bounds as well 
as the existence of a greatest element or .E.£E, tr) and a least element or 
bot tom (.L)), 
CONTINUOUS FUNCTIONS 
Let D, D1 be complete lattices. 
A function f : D + D' is contin-
uous iff for each directed set 
xco, f(UX)::: U {f(x):xE X} where 
X is directed in D iff 
('t/x,y e X) (3 z e-X) (x,y ~ z)). 
7
Turner: Montague's Intensional Logic and the Theory of Types
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1982
98. 
Given these two ideas we can build new lattices from 
old ones. The following three constructions are the crucial 
ones for the application we have in mind: 
SUM CONSTRUCTIONS 
Let D, D' be complete lattices. 
The Sum D + D' is the disjoint 
union of D and D' with the 
addition of new elements J. ,T 
such that, for each x E D or 
x ci D' , ..L ~ x ~ T. D + D' is a 
complete lattice. 
PRODUCT CONSTRUCTION 
Let D, D' be complete lattices. 
The product D x D' is the space 
D x D' = { <x, y> : x e D and ye- D' } 
where <x,y> f. <x' ,y'> iff 
x c: x' and y = y' for x ,x '€ D 
and y, y 't D' , D x D' is a 
complete lattice, 
8
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The next construction is the important one. It informs us how we 
are to turn the space of continuous functions (from one complete lattice 
into a second) into a complete lattice 
FUNCTION SPACE CONSTRUCTION 
Let D,D' be complete lattices. The 
space of continuous functions from 
D into D' (written [D-+ D' ]) consists 
of all continuous functions from D 
into D; where 
f !; g <=> (VdE:D) {f(d) ~· g(d)). 
Least upper bounds are computed by 
UF = 11.d•U{f(d): f£.F) 
for F C [D + D']. The structure 
[D+D 1 ] is a complete lattice. 
This completes the basic mathematical background. Our intension is 
to iterate the function space construction in the same way as we constructed 
the function spaces of properties - the only difference being we restrict 
attention to continuous functions at each level. We begin with a domain 
(lattice) which is largely motivated by our preliminary discussion. Let 
= E + Bool 
where Eis some basic domain (called individuals in PTQ perhaps) and Bool is 
the domain of Boolean values: 
Bool = 
T 
/ " true false " / .L • 
We then define 
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Our fir s t constraint demands that we make these function spaces 
cumulative, We do this by defining a sequence of continuous functions 
(projections): 
cp n V + V n n+l 
1/J : V + V n n+l n 
for each n > o. We define this sequence by induction on n: 
<Po (x) = >.yeV0 • x 
I/Jo (x') = XI (.1) 
and 
<Pn+l (x) == 4>n o X o 1/J n 
1/Jn+l (x') == Wn ox' 0 qi • n 
Note that in higher types it would be unreasonable to use the constant function 
identification we used for cp
0
, since such a mapping would destroy the 
functional character of these objects. These functions satisfy: tP ($ (x)) =x 
n n 
and cp (1/1 (x')) r::.x'; this can be established by induction on n. In fact we 
n n -
can extend the mappings cp , 1/J to mappings cp : V + V as follows 
n n run n m 
<Pm-1 0 • • •O cp n n < m 
cp (x) = X n == m nm 
I/Im o•t•OtlJ n-1 
m < n. 
Once again we leave the reader to check that cj> (ij> (d)) == d and 
mn run 
ij) (4> (d'))C'd'forO~n~m, 
nm mn -
We can now define our domain of functions of infinite types. According 
to our intuitions it is to be constituted of infinite sequences of functions 
<f > which are related by the condition that f is the best "approximation11 
n n~w n 
to f 
1 
available at level n - in terms of our mappings this means tP (f +l) = f , n- n n n 
10




The domain V is the set 
co 
where for <x > , <y > we define 
n OE: w n ne.w 
<x > C: <y > <=> (Vn) (x C. y ) . 
n Ill$W - n n£w n - n 
V is a complete lattice. 
co 
We can now define 
$nm :V + V and n co 
$con :V + V CX) n 
by 
<j>nm(x) = <$ni (x)> :i£w and 
$ (x) = X . 
""tl n 
Once again we leave to the reader the task of proving <j>=n(<j>n""(x)) = x 
and 4> ($ (x')) C x' • 
Il"" ""n -




It is this identification which enables us to view is "is crazy" as an n 
approximation of "is crazyn+l", 
One of our objectives has been fulfilled, We have shown how to define 
a mathematical structure whose elements are infinite sequences of functions 
which conform to our constraints. 
We can now turn to the second requirement of our theory: how are we 
to apply such sequences to each other? 
11
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Let x,ye.V00 , Then define 
The reader should perhaps check (or look-up) that application is continuous 
and satisfies x o y = x +l oy = (xoy) . n+l n n n n 
But what has become of type-theory in all this? This is an important 
question given our belief that type theory plays some role in our 
understanding of sentences like (5) and (6). If you recall this belief amounts 
to the view that when we assert (5) we assert (Sn) for each n. How does our 
definition of application fare here? The word "property" and "thing" get 
associated with elements of V, To assert the sentence (5) is equivalent 
a, 
to 
(Vf3g) (g(f) = true); 
which in V amounts to 
a, 
(Vf)(3g)((LJ gn+l(fn)) = true), 
new 
This amounts to the claim that, for each n, either gn+l (fn) = true or it is 
undefined (=~) - and it is defined somewhere. This seems to be what our 
intuitions demand. 
This all seems rather satisfactory. We have a theory which confonns to 
our intuitions regarding sentences like (1) - (6) and we have what seems to 
.hg an appropriate role for type-theory in the formal s emantics of natural 
language. This brings us to the main theorems of Scott (1972). 
Theorem. (completeness) 
12
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In fact, the x required is x = LJC\yEV •(f(y) )), The Theorem follows 
( n n n w 
by a relatively straightforward computation for xoy. 
Theorem, (Isomorphism theorem) 
V is isomorphic to [V + V ]. 
CO 00 co 
The isomorphism is given by the function qi where 
Hx) = "A.yE:.V •(xoy); ... 
qi is a one-one and onto continuous mapping V + [V +V ] , Thus, up to 
Q) 00 Q) 
isomorphism, V and [v ~ VJ are the same complete lattice and we shall 
Cl:I ID OJ 
often indicate this by using the notation 
V = [V + V ], 
co a, Q) 
The technique employed in the construction of V is a perfectly general 
00 
one, It can be used to solve any "system of equations" involving"+", 
"x" and 11+ 11 , The following system for example, occurs in the next section 
V = E + BOOL +FUN+ SINN 
SINN = [INDEX+ v] 
FUN = [V + v] 
INDEX = w X T. 
The most elegant context in which to carry this out is category theory cf. 
Smith & Plotkin (1977]. 
13
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4. NOMINALIZATION 
We might have reacted to sentences like (1) and (6) in a rather different 
way. Consider some of these once more: 
(1) Jill is crazy 
(2) John is writing papers 
(3) To write papers is crazy (to type papers is crazier) 
(4) Being crazy is (just) crazy. 
Our initial persuasion was to react to the multiplicity of "is crazy"'s by 
claiming that the verb-phrase "is crazy" denotes an infinite sequence of 
functions. But there is a different way to proceed; a way which amounts 
to the claim that "is crazy" really denotes just~ function. 
Our discussion in the previous section guarantees the existence of a 
domain OBJ which satisfies the following equation: 
OBJ = [ (E +OBJ) -+ BOOL], 
where Eis some basic domain (what PTQ calls individuals), To put 
the matter more precisely we are guaranteed the existence of homeomorphisms 
cji and !Ji: 
$:OBJ-+ [(E+OBJ) -+BOOL] 
1/1 : [ (E +OBJ) -+ BOOL] -+ OBJ, 
For the sake of clarity we shall call the domain E +OBJ the domain of things 
(THINGS say), Let's reexamine (1)-(3) and (6) with these considerations in 
mind. In sentences (1) and (2) the verb-phrases "is crazy" and "is writing 
papers" denote functions in THINGS-+ BOOL. In sentence (3) "To write papers" 
is really a nominalized form of the verb phrase "is writing papers", 
The homeomorphism~ is the one which we shall interpret as the process 
of nominalization. To see what is involved in (3) 
14
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let f denote the meaning of "is writing papers" i. e, f is an element of 
[ (E + OBJ) + BOOL] (or [THINGS + BOOL]). The meaning of "to write papers" 
is then given by the nominalization mapping as lj,(f)EOBJ - which is a 
subdomain of THING (by definition). Everything now works since f. being 
an element of [THINGS + BOOL], can be an applied to lj,(f) G THINGS, Finally 
) 
we examine sectence (6), Once again "Being crazy" is a nominalized form 
of "is crazy" and so. if f is the function which represents the meaning of 
"is crazy". then lj,(f) will represent the meaning of "Being crazy". Since 
ljJ (f) t: THINGS and f E [THINGS ~ BOOL] it makes perfect sense to apply f to 
lj,(f). 
We have thus provided an analysis of (1)-(3) and (6) without any 
explicit appeal to type-theory, It, is of course, present in the background 
in as much as type-theoretic ideas have been used in the construction of these 
domains (e,g., OBJ). Nevertheless, . once the existence of the domains is 
guaranteed we can provide a satisfactory account of these sentences without 
type-theory playing any explicit role in the analysis. We have climbed up 
the ladder of types to arrive at a point where the ladder can be dispensed 
with. 
So perhaps my initial claim, that sentences like (5) and (6) could not 
be understood or made sense of without some appeal to type-theory, was too 
hasty. Perhaps, the proper role of type-theory is not to be located in the 
analysis of sentences like (5) and (6) but rather in guaranteeing the 
existence of domains like OBJ, What ever interpretation of (5) or (6) you 
prefer, however,our theory can handle it. 
There is more to say about this interpretation of nominalization 
especially how it relates to Frege's views on the subject, This will be 
saved for a different occasion, 
15
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5, A TYPE-FREE VERSION OF 
INTENSIONAL LOGIC 
In this section we propose an "untyped"version of IL. We provide its 
syntax and semantics. The language we propose (called "EVIL" for 
reasons which are best left unsaid) is similar to IL but the Lambda 
calculus component is based on Church's untyped Lambda calculus. 
A. Syntax of EVIL 
The basic expressions consist of a denumerably infinte set bf constants 
(non logical) c~ C and a denumerably infinite set of variables xeX. The 
meaningful expressions of EVIL are defined recursively as follows: 
1, Every variable and constant (non-logical) is in EVIL, 
2. If El and E2 are (in) 
EVIL so is "'El, EiA E2' El= E2, 
3. If xis a variable and Eis (in) EVIL then so is ~x E and Ax, E 
4. If E1 and E2 
are EVIL then so is El(E2), 
s. If E is EVIL then so is OE 
6. If E is EVIL then 50 is PE and FE. 
7. If E is EVIL then so is "E and "E. 
8. Nothing else is EVIL 
B, Semantics of EVIL 
First we need to know what a model of EVIL looks like. We shall restrict 
attention to those domains which are complete lattices. So, in particular, 
we can solve recursive domain equations; such equations will form an 
integral part of our models. A model for EVIL will be an ordered six-tuple. 
":'l = <E, V, W, T, < , F> 
where 
16







F : C + V; 
W, Tare non-empty domains; 
"<" is a linear-ordering of T which is continuous, 
Eis a non-empty domain (basic value~; 
Vis a non-empty domain. 
10?°. 
In addition,we demand that our domains satisfy the following equations: 
V = E+BOOL+FUN+SINN 
SINN = [INDEX + VJ 
FUN = [V + VJ 
INDEX = w X T 
where BOOL is the domain of truth-values; SINN the domain of senses and FUN 
the domain of functions. 
To provide the semantic function itself we require one further domain to 
provide the values of variables: 
g-. ASG = [X + T] 
The domain ASG is the domain of assignments. The assignment g[xlv] where 
x E VAR and ve. V is: 
g[x\v] • 'Y· ~:(y) 
X = y 
otherwise 
C. Semantic Function 
We define a function 
VAL : EVIL + [ASG + [w X T + v]] 
by recursion on the structure of EVIL. We shall assume the model"{ is fixed 
a nl leave out all reference to it in what fallows. 
17
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(vl) VAL[c] = F(c) gwt 
(v2) VAL[x] = g(x) gwt 
true if VAL[cx] = true gwt 
and VAL[ 8] = true gwt 
(v3) VAL [ a A f3 ] = false if VAL[a] = false gwt gwt 
or VAL[s] = false gwt 
.i otherwise 
true if VAL[a] = false gwt 
(v4) VAL[ "'a] = false if VAL[S] = true gwt gwt 
J.. otherwise 
(v5), VAL[a = 8] = true iff VAL[a] = VAL[B] (false otherwise) gwt gwt gwt 
true if there exists a v EV such 
that VAL[a] [ I ] = true g XV Wt 
(v6) VAL[:l x a] 
gwt 
= false if for each v e. V 
VAL[rx]g[x lv ]wt = false 
J.. otherwise 
(v7) VAL[Ax•a] = AV e-V • VAL[a] [ i ] gwt g XV Wt 
(v8) VAL[et(B)] == 
gwt 
VAL[et] t jFUN(VAL[ a] ) gw gwt 
where 
ra) if V €:FUN 
V i FUN = Aa • 
.J.. otherwise 
18
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true if for each w'E W 
VAL[a] , = true gw t 
(v9) VAL[Oa] = false if there exists w'f W st, gwt 
VAL[a] , 
gw t = false 
..J. otherwise 




(vlO) VAL[Pa] = false if for each t I < t gwt 
VAL[a] , = false 
gwt 
J.. otherwise 
true if there exists t' > t St, 
VAL[a] t, = true gw 
(vll) VAL[Fa] = gwt false if for each t' > t 
VAL[a] , gwt = false 
.L otherwise 
(vl2) VAL[Aa] = ;l,, w' ~t' VAL[a] , 1 gwt gw t 
(v13) VAL["a] = (VAL[a] t SINN, )wt gwt gwt 
A little discussion of EVIL is clearly in order, Most of the clauses 
parallel those of IL except that certain expressions are undefined, The 
clause (vl3) is of some interest, Notice how the operation '' r" restricts 
one to elements of SINN, This replaces the purely syntactic constraint 
imposed by IL, 
19
Turner: Montague's Intensional Logic and the Theory of Types
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1982
110. 
As a side remark note that Parsons example about "the property 
of not exemplifying itself" does not create problems for us. To see this 
let 
(j) == AX • I\Jx (x) 
be the property of not exemplifying itself, Then if we evaluate 
VAL [t?(P) ] we discover this to be equal to (look at the definition of 
VAL). VAL[ "'6' (<?) ]. This can only be so if both are equal to ~GBOOL. 
We leave a more detailed investigation of EVIL for another occasion* 
but certainly the translation of the (PTQ) subset of English into 
EVIL would be identical to that for IL. Of course, one can do a lot more. 
One can, for example, handle all of Parson's extension and I believe 
all the material in Chierchia [1981]. I recommend EVIL to the 
Montague Grammarians. 
*In particular one has to prove the following: for each <I> in EVIL the 
function 
VAL[<!>] : ASG -+ [WXT + V] 
is continuous in each of its variables. This is straightforward (induction 
on <I>) but tedious:---We leave it to the reader indulge yourself in a 
little EVIL. 
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